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Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows two remote users to establish a secret key in the presence
of an eavesdropper. The users share quantum states prepared in two mutually-unbiased bases: one
to generate the key while the other monitors the presence of the eavesdropper. Here, we show that
a general d-dimension QKD system can be secured by transmitting only a subset of the monitoring
states. In particular, we find that there is no loss in the secure key rate when dropping one of
the monitoring states. Furthermore, it is possible to use only a single monitoring state if the
quantum bit error rates are low enough. We apply our formalism to an experimental d = 4 time-
phase QKD system, where only one monitoring state is transmitted, and obtain a secret key rate
of 17.4 ± 2.8 Mbits/s at a 4 dB channel loss and with a quantum bit error rate of 0.045 ± 0.001
and 0.037 ± 0.001 in time and phase bases, respectively, which is 58.4% of the secret key rate that
can be achieved with the full setup. This ratio can be increased, potentially up to 100%, if the
error rates in time and phase basis are reduced. Our results demonstrate that it is possible to
substantially simplify the design of high-dimensional QKD systems, including those that use the
spatial or temporal degrees-of-freedom of the photon, and still outperform qubit-based (d = 2)
protocols.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a symmetric en-
cryption technique that allows two remote users, called
Alice and Bob, to share a secret key in the presence
of an eavesdropper, known as Eve [1–3]. Eve can at-
tack the QKD system using any resources allowed by the
laws of quantum physics, including the use of a quantum
computer, which contrasts with conventional encryption
methods that rely on potentially vulnerable hard compu-
tation problems.
There is currently great interest in developing QKD
systems that use high-dimensional quantum states (di-
mension d) because of their higher noise tolerance and
increased photon information efficiency [4–10]. Further-
more, high-dimensional protocols based on time-phase
states allow for higher key rates for low-loss channels
appropriate for metropolitan networks when considering
the practical issue of detector saturation [11]. In fact, all
current state-of-the-art QKD systems capable of gener-
ating secret key rates exceeding 20 Mbits/s are realized
using high-dimensional protocols [11, 12]. Nonetheless,
the increased system performance of these protocols come
at the cost of increased complexity in the experimental
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setup, which makes some of these high-dimensional sys-
tems challenging to implement, especially for field appli-
cations.
Security in QKD systems arises from the use of two dif-
ferent bases by Alice and Bob that are mutually unbiased
with respect to each other in the simplest approach. In
greater detail, consider a prepare-and-measure scheme,
where Alice prepares and sends to Bob one of the d quan-
tum states in one of two bases. When she prepares a state
in one basis, Bob will measure the received state with a
high degree of accuracy if he uses the same measurement
basis. On the other hand, Bob will have a high error (1-
(1/d)) if he performs his measurement in the mutually-
unbiased basis. In a typical QKD session, Alice uses two
independent quantum random number generators to gen-
erate the key and to make a preparation-basis choice, and
Bob uses a quantum random number generator to make
a measurement-basis choice. After the session, Alice and
Bob share the basis choices over a public channel and
keep only the data when the basis choices are the same;
this is commonly known as sifting.
In practice, for efficiency reasons, one basis is typi-
cally used to encode the secret key and the other basis is
used to monitor the presence of Eve [13]. Some theoret-
ical investigations have explored the possibility of send-
ing fewer monitoring states, where instead of sending the
complete set of monitoring states, only a few of them are
employed. The advantage is that doing so may simplify
the implementation, e.g., less randomness is required and
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2possibly fewer optical elements are needed. In the case
of the Bennett-Brassard QKD with qubits (BB84), this
approach has been investigated in Refs. [14, 15], where
only one basis state |+〉 from the so-called phase basis
{|+〉, |−〉} is used to secure the qubit channel. However,
the security analyses showed that sending fewer monitor-
ing states lead to sub-optimal secret key rates compared
to the original setting whereby both |+〉 and |−〉 are em-
ployed. Recently, Tamaki et al. [16] showed that the
BB84 QKD protocol can be fully secured using only one
monitoring state, but additional measurement statistics
has to be included in the security analysis. More specif-
ically, by exploiting the additional information gleaned
from the mismatched basis statistics [17], the authors
proved that the resulting secret key rate is exactly the
same as the original BB84 QKD. Interestingly, the au-
thors also showed that the simplified protocol is loss-
tolerant: its security is highly resistant to loss-dependent
attacks exploiting state-preparation flaws [18]. Recent
experiments [19–21] have demonstrated and confirmed
the feasibility of this protocol using simplified transmit-
ters and receivers.
In this article, we extend these results for d = 2 to arbi-
trary d using semidefinite programming (SDP). In partic-
ular, we consider a family of two-basis, high-dimensional
QKD protocols, where one basis is the discrete Fourier
transform of the other, and is mutually unbiased with
respect to the other. We first analyze the security of this
generic protocol against arbitrary collective attacks for
the case where Alice sends a complete set of states in
both bases. We then show that a complete set of mon-
itoring basis states is not necessary to guarantee secu-
rity of this protocol: The protocol can be secured even
when using just one monitoring-basis state to determine
the presence of Eve as long as the channel noise is low
enough. Our analysis also takes into account the out-
comes of the events where Alice and Bob choose different
basis, thereby extending Tamaki et al.’s proof for d > 2.
We note that our analysis is limited to the case when
the state-preparation process is ideal; it remains to be
seen whether securing higher dimensional QKD proto-
cols with fewer monitoring states will lead to loss-tolerant
QKD protocols. We then apply our findings to a recently
demonstrated high-dimensional time-phase QKD exper-
iment [11]. We show that the experimental setup can
be greatly simplified if only a small number of mutually
unbiased basis states are used. Our results suggest that
other current qubit- or qudit-based protocols can be up-
graded to enhance the secure key generation rate with
simple modifications to the experimental setup.
II. PROTOCOLS AND SECURITY
FRAMEWORK
Consider a generic QKD protocol where Alice chooses
a basis, T or F, using a quantum random number gen-
erator, and prepares a photonic wavepacket to encode
a high-dimensional alphabet, where the quantum states
in the T-basis (F-basis) are used to generate the secret
key (monitor the presence of Eve). The T-basis states
are denoted as |tn〉, where n = 0, ..., d − 1. The F-basis
states are superposition of the T-basis states with distinct
phases determined by discrete Fourier transformation of
the information-basis states and given by
|fn〉 = 1√
d
d−1∑
m=0
exp
(
2piinm
d
)
|tm〉. n = 0, ..., d− 1
(1)
We consider here a prepare-and-measure protocol, but
it is well known that such a scheme can be written in
an equivalent entanglement-based description [3], where
Alice’s choice of the bit value is determined by her
measurement outcome. We therefore assume that Alice
and Bob share an entangled state of the form |φ〉AB =
(1/
√
d)
∑d−1
n=0 |tn〉A|tn〉B such that a projective measure-
ment on the entangled state by Alice determines the state
received by Bob. In addition, we assume that Eve’s in-
teraction with the shared quantum state is independent
and identically distributed (i.i.d.), so that after the trans-
mission of the signal states, the density matrix shared
among Alice, Bob and Eve is ρABE , and the state is
|Ψ〉ABE =
∑
j
√
λj |φ〉AB |j〉E . Such an i.i.d. interaction
of Eve in the quantum channel is known as a collective at-
tack. The security proof against a collective attack can
be promoted to the general attacks using known tech-
niques, such as the de Finetti theorem, if the quantum
states are permutationally invariant [22–25].
The primary challenge of our security analysis is to
place an upper bound on the so-called phase error rate
eUF so that a valid lower bound on the key can be ob-
tained. The phase error rate is defined as the error rate
observed when the entangled state is measured hypothet-
ically in the F-basis, but the actual measurements by Al-
ice and Bob are performed in the information (T) basis.
Phase errors are not directly observed in the experiment;
rather, they are estimated based on the observed quan-
tum bit error rates from the experiment via classical ran-
dom sampling techniques. We distinguish the phase error
rate from the quantum bit error rates in T and F bases,
which are denoted by eT and eF, respectively. These are
error rates that occur when Alice and Bob prepare and
measure the quantum states in the same basis (T or F),
but detect different quantum states.
To determine the maximum value of eUF in this proto-
col, we cast it into a maximization-SDP problem, where
we use the a priori known statistics of the compatible
positive-operator valued measure (POVM) of Alice and
Bob. Similar SDP-based security analyses were recently
presented in Ref. [26]. However, our approach is differ-
ent in that we are interested in bounding the phase error
rate when Alice transmits to Bob less than a complete
set of monitoring-basis states. Additionally, there are
some conceptual differences between our approach and
the more direct approach proposed by Coles et.al [26].
3In particular, our approach is focused on bounding the
phase error rate while the latter is focused on bound-
ing the conditional von Neumann entropy of ρAE , which
roughly speaking characterizes the asymptotic secret key
rate of QKD assuming one-way classical communica-
tion [27]. Our approach, on the other hand, uses a well-
established argument (involving the equivalence between
entanglement distillation and quantum error correction
via CSS codes) to bound the entropy term using the
phase error rate [28]. Hence, our approach is less di-
rect, in the sense that we use one more step to bound the
secret key rate. Interestingly, as we will see below, there
appears to be no difference between the two approaches
in terms of the achievable secret key rates, at least for
the QKD protocols considered in this work. More specif-
ically, in the case of two mutually unbiased bases with
complete states, we obtain the same key rates as those
predicted by earlier theoretical findings [29] for d <= 7.
The measurement statistics can also be extracted from
the experiment. For example, all the statistics of Alice
and Bob’s projective measurements, ΠTn = |tn〉〈tn| and
ΠFn = |fn〉〈fn| where n = 0 to d − 1, on the entangled
state ρAB are well defined and can be extracted from
the experiment. In addition, the statistics of the error
operators in the T and F bases, EF and ET, respectively,
are also known. Therefore, the problem can be cast as
the following optimization problem
maximize: Tr(EFρAB) = e
U
F (2)
s.t.,Tr(ρAB) = 1, (3)
ρAB ≥ 0, (4)
Tr(ETρAB) = eT, (5)
Tr(Πan ⊗ΠbmρAB) = pa,bn,m, (6)
∀{a, b} ∈ {T,F} & n,m = 0, ..., d− 1 (7)
In Eq. 5, the quantum bit error rate eT is measured di-
rectly in the experiment. The probabilities pa,bn,m of Alice
sending a state and Bob receiving a state are also known.
The fact that we are allowing ρAB to be arbitrary also
implies that Eve can perform any arbitrary operations on
the states transmitted between Alice and Bob, and hence
the bound is valid for any collective attack respecting the
given measurement statistics. The only unknown rele-
vant quantity in the optimization problem is the phase
error rate eUF , which we can efficiently solve using CVX,
which is a Matlab software designed for convex optimiza-
tion problems [30]. Explicit calculation of these operators
is shown in Appendix A and Appendix B.
To demonstrate that this method of optimization vali-
dates previously known bounds [29, 31], we first calculate
the secret key fraction defined as the number of bits per
received state, which is given by
K := log2 d− h(eUF )−∆Leak, (8)
where h(x) := −x log2(x/(d−1))−(1−x) log2(1−x) is the
binary entropy, ∆Leak := h(eT) is the fraction of the key
revealed during error correction, and we have assumed
that Alice and Bob exchange an infinitely-long key for
simplicity. The secure key rate is given byR = rK, where
r is the symbol preparation rate, which may depend on
d for some protocols. Below, we relax the assumption
of Alice using a single-photon source and consider the
case whereby Alice sends weak coherent states instead
of single-photon states, which is often used in practical
QKD systems.
A. Secret key fraction for two-basis d = 4 QKD
systems
In Fig. 1(a), we show the dependence of K on eT for
d = 4 when Alice transmits all four information-basis
states and a varying number of monitoring-basis states.
For reference, we also show the dependence of K on eT for
d = 2 (black dashed line). For the specific case where Al-
ice sends all four monitoring-basis states (solid red line),
we find that the maximum error tolerance is ∼ 18.9%,
which is in agreement with existing findings (assuming
depolarizing quantum channel) [29, 31]. The error toler-
ance is defined as the error rate eT beyond which K = 0.
(a)
(b)
K
eU F
eT
eT
FIG. 1. The secret key fraction (a) and the numerically ob-
tained upper bound on the phase error rate (b) plotted as a
function of the quantum bit error rate for d = 4.
We find that K is the same when Alice sends only
three monitoring-basis states (Fig. 1(a), dotted blue
line) in comparison to the case when she sends all four
monitoring-basis states, illustrating that one of the states
is redundant. The redundancy of mutually unbiased ba-
sis states was previously studied analytically for BB84-
type (d = 2) protocols in Ref. [16]. However, the same
approach cannot be used when Alice transmits less than
4d− 1 monitoring states. Our SDP approach extends the
result of Ref. [16] and makes it possible to analyze the
security for any subset of mutually unbiased basis states.
For the case where Alice sends only one state or two
states in the monitoring basis, the protocol still gener-
ates a positive secret key fraction, as illustrated by green
and orange lines in Fig. 1(a), but with a lower error toler-
ance (7.5% and 10%). Despite the lower error tolerance,
we observe that the secret key fraction generated with
one and two monitoring basis states in d = 4 are higher
than the secret key fraction achieved with d = 2 if eT are
less than ∼ 5.3 and ∼ 8.9%, as indicated with the blue
and red vertical dashed lines, respectively.
For protocols in which it takes the same duration (time
window) to prepare an arbitrary dimension state, this
translates into higher secret key rate. Examples of such
protocols include the ones where quantum states are pre-
pared using spatial degrees of freedom, such as OAM-
QKD protocols [7]. On the other hand, protocols for
which a d = 4 state takes twice the time-window to pre-
pare a state compared to a d = 2 state, such as time-
bin encoding schemes [11, 12], this still translates into a
higher secret key rate if the channel loss is low (photon
rate is high), and the detectors are operated near the
saturation regime.
In Fig. 1(b), we show the SDP-obtained upper bound
on the phase error rate eUF as a function of eT. As was ob-
served by Tamaki et al. for d = 2, we also find that the er-
ror tolerance of the protocol when Alice sends only three
monitoring-basis states is identical to the case where she
sends all four states. This is because complete knowl-
edge of the remaining unused monitoring state can be
reconstructed from the statistics of the d− 1 states that
are used and from the statistics of the events where Al-
ice and Bob choose different basis. However, when Alice
sends only one or two monitoring-basis states, complete
knowledge of the non-transmitted states cannot be re-
constructed using the experimentally determined statis-
tics. Thus, the phase error rate increases faster than the
quantum bit error rate, resulting in reduced secret key
fraction and lower error tolerance as shown in Fig. 1(b).
B. Secret key fraction for d = 2 to d = 7 with d− 1
and one monitoring-basis state
To demonstrate the applicability of our method for
higher dimension, we consider protocols with d between 2
and 7. Specifically, we obtain the secret key fraction and
the upper bound on eUF for two specific cases: when Alice
transmits d−1 or 1 monitoring-basis states to secure the
protocol. The results are presented in Fig. 2.
In Fig. 2(a), we plot the dependence of K on eT when
Alice transmits d − 1 monitoring basis states (dashed
lines). We find that the error tolerance for all these cases
are in agreement with the previously known bounds pre-
sented in Ref. [29, 31]. In Fig. 2(b), we plot the corre-
sponding eUF as a function of the eT, and observe that for
all d values, eUF = eT, as indicated by the black dashed
line. This is expected for symmetric two-basis protocol.
eU F
K
(a)
(b)
eT
eT
FIG. 2. The secret key fraction (a) and the upper bound on
the phase error rate (b) plotted as a function of the quantum
bit error rate when Alice transmits d− 1 states and only one
monitoring basis state.
In Fig. 2(a), we also show the dependence of K on eT
between d = 2 and 7 (solid lines), when Alice transmits
only one monitoring-basis state to secure the protocol.
For all d, we observe that the higher-dimensional pro-
tocols have higher K than d = 2 when eT is relatively
small. The value of eT beyond which d = 2 will have a
larger value of K depends on the dimension of the sys-
tem. Overall, we find that the error tolerance of all high-
dimensional (d > 2) protocols is around 7.1-7.5%, which
is smaller than d = 2. However, if eT is small, then the
high-dimensional protocols generate more secret key per
received state as shown in Fig. 2(a). In Fig. 2(b), we
show the corresponding eUF as a function of eT. We find
that as d increases, the bound of eUF gets worse, which
is in contrast with the case where Alice transmits d − 1
states.
In general, if the dimension of a QKD system can
be changed easily, an experimentalist can estimate the
expected upper bound on the phase error rate using
Fig. 2(b), and then select the value of d and the number
of monitoring-basis states that will maximize the number
of secret bits per state.
5C. Three-Intensity Decoy Technique
The secret key fraction calculated above is based on
an ideal single-photon source. However, most experi-
mental implementations of QKD protocols are based on
phase-randomized weak coherent sources that have pho-
ton statistics given by the Poisson distribution. It is well
known that a weak coherent source with multiple decoy
intensities can be used to achieve secret key rates simi-
lar to an ideal single-photon source. Here, we combine
the numerics-based approach discussed above with the
decoy-state technique [32, 33] to show how to bound se-
cret key fractions when imperfect sources are used in a
QKD system.
Suppose that Alice sends quantum states with three
different mean photon numbers k ∈ (µ, ν, ω), each trans-
mitted with a probability pk. The signal-state mean pho-
ton number µ is assumed to be larger than the sum of
the two decoy-state mean photon numbers ν, ω, i.e.,
ν + ω < µ. In addition, we assume that 0 ≤ ω ≤ ν.
Under these conditions, the secret key fraction can be
expressed as
K := RT,1[log2 d− h{eUF (.)}]−RT∆Leak, (9)
where RT,1 is the single-photon gain in the T basis, e
U
F
is a function of the single-photon error rate in F basis,
denoted by eF,1, and RT is the overall gain in the T basis.
The single-photon gain is bounded by
RT,1 = [pµ(µe
µ) + pν(νe
ν) + pω(ωe
ω)]YT,1, (10)
where
YT,1 = max
{
µ
µν − µω − ν2 + ω2 [RT,νe
ν −RT,ωeω
−ν
2 − ω2
µ2
(RT,µe
µ − YT,0)], 0
}
(11)
is the single-photon yield, RT,k is the gain corresponding
to mean photon number k ∈ (µ, ν, ω) in the T basis, and
YT,0 is the zero-photon yield in the T basis bounded by
YT,0 = max
{
νRT,ωe
ω − ωRT,νeν
ν − ω , 0
}
. (12)
Finally, the single-photon error rate in the F basis is given
by
eF,1 = min
{
eF,νRF,νe
ν − eF,ωRF,ωeω
(ν − ω)YF,1 ,
1
2
}
, (13)
where eF,k is the error rate in the F basis with mean
photon number k. In Eq. 13, YF,1 is the single-photon
yield in the F basis, which is obtained from Eq. 11 by
replacing T with F.
When all d or d − 1 states are transmitted in the F
basis, eUF (.) = eF,1, and therefore obtaining a bound nu-
merically is not necessary. However, when only one state
in the F basis is transmitted to monitor the presence of an
eavesdropper, eUF (.) can be estimated in two steps. First,
estimate the single-photon error rate in the F basis using
Eq. 13. Second, find the corresponding eUF from Fig. 2(b)
using the value for the single-photon quantum bit error
rate found in the first step. The same procedure can be
repeated for any number of monitoring states.
III. EXPERIMENTAL DEMONSTRATION
To demonstrate the applicability of our efficient
method to a real QKD system, we consider the use of
time-phase states as implemented recently in a high-rate
QKD [11]. In this experiment, the time states encode the
information, and the phase basis states monitor for an
eavesdropper. The d = 4 time-basis states are coherent-
state wavepackets of duration 66 ps localized to one of
the four contiguous time bins as shown in Fig. 3(a). The
time-bin width τ is set to 400 ps so that the symbol dura-
tion is 1.6 ns. The phase-basis states are given by Eq. 1.
Figure 3(b) shows a schematic of the experimental
setup used to implement the protocol. The quantum
states are generated by modulating the intensity and
phase of a continuous wave laser (1550 nm) using three
electro-optic intensity modulators (IM, only one shown
for Clarity) and one phase modulator (PM). All electro-
optic modulators are from EOSpace. The first IM is
driven with a 5 GHz sine-wave signal generator to cre-
ate 66 ps-width pulse train. The second intensity mod-
ulator is used to create the time and phase states, and
the third IM (not shown) is used to generate the de-
coy intensities. The mean photon numbers for the sig-
nal, decoy and vacuum states are set to 0.66, 0.16 and
0.002, respectively, at all channel losses except at 4 dB
loss where the mean photon numbers are set to 0.45,
0.12 and 0.002. The repetition rate of the states are set
to r = 625 MHz using a sequence of arbitrary patterns
loaded on a field-programmable gate array (FPGA, not
shown here for clarity). The states are then attenuated
to the single-photon level using a variable optical atten-
uator (Att) and transmitted through a quantum channel
to Bob. At the receiver, Bob uses a directional coupler
to direct 90% of the quantum states for time-bin basis
measurement and 10% for the phase basis measurement.
The time-basis states are measured using low timing-
jitter, single-photon counting detectors (Dt) connected to
a high-resolution (50 ps) time-to-digital converter (Agi-
lent Acqiris U1051A), and the phase basis measurement
scheme requires three time-delay interferometers (DIs)
coupled into superconducting nanowire single-photon de-
tectors (SNSPDs D0, D1, D2, and D3) [34]. The detec-
tors used in this experiments have high detection effi-
ciency (>70%), low timing-jitter (< 50 ps) and low dark
count rates (< 100 cps).
In the experiment, all eight time and phase basis states
are generated. However, the error rate in the phase basis
are state-dependent, that is, some states are generated
6DtLaser IM PM Att 2x1
DI1
DI2 DI3
D0 D2 D1 D3
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FIG. 3. (a) Illustration of the four dimensional time-phase
states. (b) Experimental setup of d = 4 time-phase QKD.
and detected more accurately than the others, mainly
due to experimental challenges associated with generat-
ing the phase-basis states. Specifically, to generate |f1〉,
|f2〉, and |f3〉, three independent FPGA signals need to
be combined at a 3×1 coupler and the output signal is
then used to drive the phase modulator. Each individ-
ual signal from the FPGA propagates through a different
path and thus arrive at the coupler at a different time.
Therefore, the combined signal used to drive the phase
modulator is not perfect and results in imperfect phase
values. In addition, the phase of the delay interferometers
is not accurate, which can lead to state-dependent error
rates as well. The error rate in phase basis as a function
of the quantum channel loss is shown in Fig. 4(a).
Here, we consider the effect of reducing the number
of phase-basis states on the extractable secret key rate.
Suppose that Alice only transmits the state with the low-
est error rate (|f0〉 in this case) to determine the presence
of an eavesdropper, which reduces the average quantum
bit error rate in the phase basis. However, the bound for
the phase error rate when only one state is transmitted is
always higher (worse) than the bound when all states are
transmitted, as shown in Fig. 1(b). This means that the
secret key rate in the case where only one state is trans-
mitted may be reduced even if the average quantum bit
error rate is very small. This is illustrated in Fig. 4(b),
(a)
(b)
Quantum Channel Loss (dB)
R 
(M
bit
s/s
)
Quantum Channel Loss (dB)
|f0i|f2i
|f1i
|f3i
e F
FIG. 4. (a) The error rates corresponding to each of the phase
basis states plotted as a function of the channel loss. (b)
Asymptotic secret key rates for the cases where Alice trans-
mits one or four phase basis states are plotted as a function
of quantum channel loss.
where we plot the experimentally extractable secret key
rate as a function of channel loss. The orange data points
represent the extractable secret key rates when all four
phase-basis states are transmitted; the blue data points
represent the secret key rates when only |f0〉 is trans-
mitted. The dashed lines represent the simulated secret
key rates calculated using parameters that match the ex-
perimental conditions. As expected, it is seen that the
secret key rate is smaller for the case where only state
|f0〉 is transmitted to monitor the presence of an eaves-
dropper. However, the reduction of the secret key at 4 dB
channel loss is only 41.6% compared to the case where
all four phase-basis states are transmitted. In many im-
plementations of QKD systems, the simplification of the
experimental setup at the cost of a moderately lower se-
cret key rate may be beneficial, especially for situations
where the highest possible secret key rate is not the most
important metric.
IV. SIMULATION OF SECRET KEY RATES
To illustrate the advantage of the high-dimensional
time-phase protocol with one monitoring basis state, here
we simulate the secret key rate for d = 2 and d = 4 for
two specific cases. First, we consider the case when Bob’s
detectors operate at 75% detector efficiency independent
7of the incoming photon rate; that is, we assume that the
detectors do not saturate. We also consider the case when
Bob’s detector saturate as the incoming photon rate ex-
ceeds a few mega-counts-per-second (Mcps), as is true for
most practical systems [11].
We provide the details of our simulation in Appendix
D. In our simulation, we use the channel model provided
in Ref. [11], and model the detector saturation using a
hyperbolic tangent function. Specifically, we model the
photon detection rate as a function incoming photon rate
as a tanh(rx/b), where rx is the expected photon rate,
and a and b are fit parameters obtained from calibration.
For a single-pixel SNSPD, we find a = 6.5 ± 0.7 MHz
and b = 8.63 ± 1.80 MHz.
Given these two detector models, we simulate the se-
cret key rates for d = 2 and d = 4. For d = 4, we consider
the cases where Alice transmits all four monitoring states
as well as just one monitoring state. Figure 5(a) shows
the dependence of secret key rate as a function of the
quantum channel loss when the detectors are assumed to
be operating at 75% efficiency, independent of the incom-
ing photon rate. We observe that there is no difference
in secret key generation rate between d = 2 and d = 4
when all monitoring basis states are transmitted. When
only one monitoring basis state is transmitted, the d = 4
protocol has a lower secret key rate than d = 2 protocol.
In Fig. 5(b), we plot the secret key rate as a function
of channel loss assuming detector saturation, which is a
practical problem. It is seen that when complete sets
of monitoring basis states are used, a higher secret key
rate can be generated using d = 4 than d = 2 upto a
quantum channel loss of ∼ 20 dB, as indicated by red
dashed vertical line. Additionally, the secret key rate
when only one monitoring basis is transmitted in d = 4 is
also higher than d = 2 until ∼ 10.5 dB channel loss (gray
dashed line). These results show that in the regime of
detector saturation, one monitoring basis state in d = 4
generates higher secret key rate than d = 2.
V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we demonstrate that it is possible to se-
cure a high-dimensional QKD system when using less
than complete set of mutually unbiased basis states.
For systems with low error, we show that it is possi-
ble to use only one monitoring-basis state, which offers
substantial advantages in the implementation of high-
dimensional systems. Another implication of our method
is that many of the current QKD systems, such as the
time-bin-encoded variant of BB84 [35], and the coher-
ent one-way QKD protocols [36], can be easily upgraded
to high-dimension protocols with simple modifications to
the setup, thereby increasing the secure key rate of these
systems.
(a)
(b)
FIG. 5. Dependence of secret key rate on the quantum chan-
nel loss when (a) the detectors are assumed to have a fixed
efficiency of 75% and (b) the detectors are assumed to have a
rate-dependent efficiency.
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APPENDICES
A. Security Analysis Framework
We analyze the security of the protocol by casting the
problem into an optimization framework [37]. As dis-
cussed in the main text, the procedure requires values
of all statistics known a priori to maximize the single-
photon phase-error rate, which quantifies the amount
of information Eve has about Alice’s measurement out-
comes.
Analysis of qudit protocols requires promoting Pauli
matrices, which are used as the Hilbert-Schmidt basis for
qubit-based protocols, to higher dimensions. Specifically,
we require a high-dimensional basis set that satisfies two
8specific criteria: 1) excluding the identity matrix, all
other Pauli-equivalent matrices in the high-dimensional
space must be traceless; and 2) the matrices must be or-
thogonal. One set of matrices that satisfies these require-
ments are the Weyl operators [38]. For a d-dimensional
system, the d2 of basis operators are given by
Unm =
d−1∑
k=0
e
2piikn
d |k〉〈k +m|, n,m = 0, 1, ..., d− 1,
(14)
where states |k〉 and |k + m〉 are in the computational
basis.
In an equivalent entanglement distillation version, Al-
ice prepares an entangled state of the form
|φ〉AB = 1√
d
d−1∑
k=0
|k〉A|k〉B , (15)
where she chooses to measure either in {T,F} and Bob
chooses to measure in {T,F∗}. Note that the random ba-
sis choice of {T,F}means that Alice performs the identity
operation I for T and rotation H for F before sending the
state to Bob. Here, H is an operator that performs the
discrete Fourier transformation. Upon arrival of the sig-
nal states, Bob performs a unitary operation I for T and
H−1 for F.
We assume that Eve’s interaction with Alice and Bob’s
qudits is independent and identically distributed (i.i.d)
such that Eve holds an ancillary on Alice and Bob’s qu-
dits. This choice of modeling addresses so-called collec-
tive attacks. The fact that we assume Eve interacts
with Alice and Bob qudits i.i.d means that the state
shared among Alice, Bob and Eve can be written as
|Ψ〉ABE =
∑
j
√
λj |φ〉AB |j〉, such that Eve holds a purifi-
cation of an ancillary characterized through the density
operator
ρE = TrAB [ |Ψ〉ABE〈Ψ| ]. (16)
It is well known that one can promote the security
for collective attacks to coherent attacks if the quantum
states are permutationally invariant using techniques like
the quantum de Finetti theorem [22–24]. We note that
the quantum states shared between Alice and Bob con-
sists of blocks of time bins or frames, which consists of
vital coherence information. These states are permuta-
tionally invariant only if they are considered as frames
and not as individual time bins.
Eve’s interaction with Alice and Bob’s qudits intro-
duces an average disturbance eX, where X ∈ {T,F} rep-
resents the basis. The quantum bit error can be written
as
eT = Tr(ρABET), (17)
and the phase error can be written as
eF = Tr(ρABEF), (18)
where EX are error operators in the X ∈ {T,F} basis.
The error operator in the T basis and is given by,
ET =
∑
l∈{0,...,d−1}
∑
k∈{0,...,d−1}∗
|lA, (l + k)B〉〈lA, (l + k)B |
(19)
The asterisk in the index of the sum represents the fact
that all the indices should follow the general rule l+ k 6=
k. Similarly, the error operator in the F basis can be
written as
EF = (H†A ⊗HB)ET(HA ⊗H†B). (20)
Finally, the projectors can be written as
Pl = |l〉〈l| and Pl˜ = |l˜〉〈l˜| (21)
for both the T and F bases.
B. Explicit Calculation for d = 4
In this section, we go through the explicit steps
for the security analysis for d = 4 time-phase states.
The temporal states (T-basis states) are denoted by
|t0〉, |t1〉, |t2〉, |t3〉. The corresponding phase states (F-
basis states) are then given by
|f0〉 = 1
2
(|t0〉+ |t1〉+ |t2〉+ |t3〉),
|f1〉 = 1
2
(|t0〉+ i|t1〉 − |t2〉 − i|t3〉),
|f2〉 = 1
2
(|t0〉 − |t1〉+ |t2〉 − |t3〉),
|f3〉 = 1
2
(|t0〉 − i|t1〉 − |t2〉+ i|t3〉) (22)
via discrete Fourier transformation.
The bit error operator in T-basis is given by
ET =

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

,
(23)
9and the Fourier-transform matrix for d = 4 is given by
H = 1√
4

1 1 1 1
1 e
1
2 [−(pii)]1 e
1
2 [−(pii)]2 e
1
2 [−(pii)]3
1 e
1
2 [−(pii)]2 e
1
2 [−(pii)]4 e
1
2 [−(pii)]6
1 e
1
2 [−(pii)]3 e
1
2 [−(pii)]6 e
1
2 [−(pii)]9
 . (24)
Therefore, the error operator for the phase basis is given
by EF = (H†A⊗HB)ET(HA⊗H†B). All the joint probabil-
ities where Alice sends states in one basis and Bob mea-
sures in the other is equal 1/16. All the joint probabil-
ities for partial measurements, where Alice sends states
in the T-basis and Bob measures in the F-basis are equal
to 1/4(1-eT) for correct measurements, and equal to
1/12eT for incorrect measurements.
C. Pseudo-Code for SDP
The algorithm for the SDP code is as follows:
maximize Tr(EFρAB) such that,
Tr(ρAB) = 1
ρAB ≥ 0
%QBER is the expected experimental error
Tr(ETρAB) = eT
%All the joint operators where Alice sends F
and Bob measures in T
%The indices i, j = 1:4
Tr(|fi〉〈fi| ⊗ |tj〉〈tj |ρAB) = 116
%All the joint operators where Alice sends T
and Bob measures in F
%The indices i, j = 1:4
Tr(|ti〉〈ti| ⊗ |fj〉〈fj |ρAB) = 116
%All the partial measurements where Alice
sends F and Bob measures in F
Tr(|f0〉〈f0| ⊗ |f0〉〈f0|ρAB) = 1/4× (1− eT)
Tr(|f0〉〈f0| ⊗ |f1〉〈f1|ρAB) = 1/12× eT
Tr(|f0〉〈f0| ⊗ |f2〉〈f2|ρAB) = 1/12× eT
Tr(|f0〉〈f0| ⊗ |f3〉〈f3|ρAB) = 1/12× eT
Tr(|f1〉〈f1| ⊗ |f0〉〈f0|ρAB) = 1/12× eT
Tr(|f1〉〈f1| ⊗ |f1〉〈f1|ρAB) = 1/4× (1− eT)
Tr(|f1〉〈f1| ⊗ |f2〉〈f2|ρAB) = 1/12× eT
Tr(|f1〉〈f1| ⊗ |f3〉〈f3|ρAB) = 1/12× eT
Tr(|f2〉〈f2| ⊗ |f0〉〈f0|ρAB) = 1/12× eT
Tr(|f2〉〈f2| ⊗ |f1〉〈f1|ρAB) = 1/12× eT
Tr(|f2〉〈f2| ⊗ |f2〉〈f2|ρAB) = 1/4× (1− eT)
Tr(|f2〉〈f2| ⊗ |f3〉〈f3|ρAB) = 1/12× eT
Tr(|f3〉〈f3| ⊗ |f0〉〈f0|ρAB) = 1/12× eT
Tr(|f3〉〈f3| ⊗ |f1〉〈f1|ρAB) = 1/12× eT
Tr(|f3〉〈f3| ⊗ |f2〉〈f2|ρAB) = 1/12× eT
Tr(|f3〉〈f3| ⊗ |f3〉〈f3|ρAB) = 1/4× (1− eT)
The last sixteen lines show explicitly the partial measure-
ments of only a subset of the F-basis states.
D. Channel Model
We adopt the channel model described in Ref. [11].
Specifically, we model the probability of Alice transmit-
ting a state and Bob receiving it as
RX,k = [1− exp(−ηdetηchk)] + Pd/d, (25)
where ηch is the transmission of the quantum channel,
ηdet is the efficiency of the single-photon detector, k ∈
{µ, ν, ω} is the mean photon number, X ∈ {T,F} is the
basis, and Pd is the probability of detecting an event
due to detector dark counts. The overall gain can be
expressed as
RX = pµRX,µ + pνRX,ν + pωRX,ω. (26)
Similarly, the probability of Bob receiving an incorrect
state can be written as
EX,k = ed[1− exp(−ηdetηchk)] + (d− 1)Pd/d, (27)
where ed is the intrinsic error rate. The overall error rate
can be written as
EX = pµEX,µ + pνEX,ν + pωEX,ω. (28)
The secret key fraction is then simulated by calculat-
ing the bounds for RT,1, e
U
F , ∆Leak := ET/RT and then
calculating K in Eq. 9. The secret key rate can then
be determined by calculating rK, where r is the state
preparation rate.
In our simulations shown in Sec. IV, we use Pd = 10
−7,
ed = 0.005 × d, r = 2500/d MHz, Pµ = 0.8, Pν = 0.1
and Pν = 0.1. The probability of transmitting time and
phase basis states are set to PT = 0.9 and PF = 0.1 to
maximize the secret key rate [35]. We optimize the mean
photon numbers at every channel loss using the Matlab
function Fmincon. We set the mean photon numbers be-
tween 0.05 and 0.97 under the constraint ν + ω < µ and
0 ≤ ω ≤ ν. For the case where we assume that the detec-
tor efficiencies are independent of the incoming photon
rate, we set ηdet = 0.75. When we take the detector sat-
uration into account, we assume that the dependence of
the detection rate as a function of the expected rate can
be modeled as a tanh(rx/b) as discussed in the main text.
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